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Abstract
Let G1 be a cyclic multiplicative group of order n. It is known that the Diffie-Hellman problem
is random self-reducible in G1 with respect to a fixed generator g if φ(n) is known. That is, given
g, gx ∈ G1 and having oracle access to a ‘Diffie-Hellman Problem’ solver with fixed generator g, it is
possible to compute g1/x ∈ G1 in polynomial time (see theorem 3.2). On the other hand, it is not
known if such a reduction exists when φ(n) is unknown (see conjuncture 3.1). We exploit this “gap”
to construct a cryptosystem based on hidden order groups and present a practical implementation of a
novel cryptographic primitive called an Oracle Strong Associative One-Way Function (O-SAOWF).
O-SAOWFs have applications in multiparty protocols. We demonstrate this by presenting a key
agreement protocol for dynamic ad-hoc groups.
1 Introduction
The problem of efficient key agreement in ad-hoc groups is a challenging problem, primarily because
membership in such groups does not follow any specified pattern. We envisage an ad-hoc group as a
broadcast group where members do not have one-to-one channels; rather they share the communication
medium such that everyone within range is able to receive any broadcast message. An efficient group key
agreement protocol in this scenario should satisfy the property that the shared group key is computable
without interaction with the other members. Such protocols are often called one-round key agreement
protocols where the only round consists of the initial key distribution phase. Two notable examples of
one-round key agreement protocols are the classic two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [1] and the Joux
tripartite key exchange using bilinear maps [2]. However, till date constructing a generalized one-round
n-party key agreement protocol has remained a challenging and open problem. In this paper, we present
the first practical example of a one-round key agreement protocol for arbitrary size groups. Although
our construction enables the group key to be computed non-interactively, it comes with a caveat; a third
party is required to do most of the computation.
We refer the reader to [3, 4] for a survey of key agreement protocols for ad-hoc groups. In the literature,
most group key agreement protocols are classified in three categories (a) Centralized, (b) Distributed and
(c) Fully Contributory. Our proposed method is fully contributory, yet it uses a central authority. We
elaborate on this below.
The original two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [1] can be extended to fully contributory multi-
party key exchange as demonstrated in [5] using the Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) protocol. However, all
protocols based on GDH require many rounds of sequential messages to be exchanged between members.
Centralized protocols, on the other hand have their own disadvantages; the central controller needs to
maintain a large amount of state information for the groups it is managing. Our approach is to combine
the two methods and design an efficient one-round key agreement protocol where the central controller
does not maintain any state information.
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Our protocol uses a central authority in computing the shared group key. However, the central
authority is not responsible for key distribution and is only used as an “oracle” (i.e. a computing device)
with public access. Users do not require secure channels in communicating with this oracle. Additionally,
we provide a method to verify that the oracle is performing correctly. In our protocol, this oracle has
some trapdoor information that can be efficiently used to compute partial public keys that are sent to
users over an insecure public channel. Thus, our protocol can be directly converted into a de-centralized
(or distributed) one simply by sharing this trapdoor information between a number of trusted authorities
and allowing multiple “copies” of this oracle to function simultaneously. In effect, we present an entirely
new model for secure group communication (see figure 1).
In our model, secure group communication is facilitated by the Oracle. Assuming that public
keys are known in advance, users can use this Oracle to compute a shared secret key indepen-
dently of the other users such that no (active or passive) adversary has the ability to compute
this key. Essentially the oracle is used as a “verifiable computing device” and the adversary as
the communication medium.
Figure 1: Secure group communication in our model.
Our basic idea arises due to the paper of Rabi and Sherman [6], where they described a cryptographic
primitive called a Strong Associative One-Way Function (SAOWF), and discussed as an application a
one-round key agreement protocol in ad-hoc groups. In related work, Boneh and Silverberg also proposed
a one-round key agreement protocol for ad-hoc groups based on a similar primitive called a multilinear
map [7]. However, as of now no practical construction of either primitive is known. In this paper we
extend the work of Rabi and Sherman and give a practical construction of a SAOWF under a restricted
model of computation, namely black-box computation.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give some background and notation. We define
2
SAOWFs in section 2.1 and extend this definition to include black-box computation in section 2.4. Our
construction is presented in section 4 and some applications are given in section 5. Finally, we discuss
implementation issues in section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Around 1984, Rivest and Sherman suggested the idea of one-round key agreement in ad-hoc groups using
a class of cryptographic primitives that they called Associative One-Way Functions (AOWFs) [8, 9].
Later in 1993, Rabi and Sherman suggested the use of AOWFs in digital signatures [10]. In subsequent
work, Rabi and Sherman [6] gave an existence proof of complexity theoretic AOWFs under the P 6= NP
hypothesis. Other authors studied complexity theoretic AOWFs with respect to different properties
such as low ambiguity, strong invertibility, totality and commutativity [11, 12, 13]. Finally, in [14],
Hemaspaandra, Rothe and Saxena gave a complete characterization of complexity theoretic AOWFs.
In all the above works, however, the AOWFs considered are complexity theoretic, that is, they exhibit
useful characteristics only in the worst case and not in the average case. Such constructions do not
have much practical significance in the context of cryptography. In this work we focus on cryptographic
AOWFs - that exhibit useful characteristics even in the average case. Additionally, we study only a small
family of AOWFs, namely those that are commutative, total and strongly non-invertible. We call this
the class of Strong Associative One-Way Functions (SAOWFs).
2.1 Strong Associative One-Way Functions
Let (G, ⋆) be a finite abelian group. The mapping
f : G×G 7→ G
(A,B) 7→ A ⋆ B
has the following four properties (we use the notation f(A,B) and A ⋆ B interchangeably):
P1. Associativity: f(f(A,B), C) = f(A, f(B,C)) ∀A,B,C ∈ G.
P2. Commutativity: f(A,B) = f(B,A) ∀A,B ∈ G.
P3. Identity: There exists a unique element I ∈ G such that f(A, I) = A ∀A ∈ G. We say I is the
identity element. Denote by G∗ the set G\{I}.
P4. Inverses: For each A ∈ G∗, there exists a unique B ∈ G∗ such that f(A,B) = I. We say B is the
inverse of A and denote it by A−1.
The above properties come for “free” in any abelian group. We now additionally want to enforce the
following three properties on (G, ⋆):
P5. Samplability: Elements of G must be efficiently samplable.
P6. Computability: For all A,B ∈ G, f(A,B) must be efficiently computable.
P7. Strong Non-Invertibility: Let A,B
R
← G∗ and C ← f(A,B) ∈ G. Given A,C, computing
B = f(C,A−1) must be infeasible in the average case.
Definition 2.1. We say that f is a Strong Associative One-Way Function (SAOWF) if properties P1-P7
are satisfied.1
1Most researchers differentiate between commutative and non-commutative SAOWFs [14]. For simplicity, we will enforce
the commutativity property (P2) in our definition.
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Remark 2.2. A SAOWF as defined above is analogous to a Group with Infeasible Inversion (GII) defined
in [15].
Although SAOWFs have many applications as demonstrated in [6, 15, 16], exhibiting a practical
construction of a SAOWF is still an open problem. We make a positive progress in this direction by
presenting a practical black-box construction of a SAOWF.
We note that it is possible to construct a SAOWF f under the P 6= NP hypothesis if we replace
“average case” by “worst case” in the statement of property P7 [13, 14]. However, for applications
significant to cryptography we require property P7 to be defined in the average case. For completeness,
we also define weak non-invertibility as follows.
P8. Weak Non-Invertibility: Let C
R
← G∗. Given C, computing any pair (A,B) ∈ G∗2 such that
C = f(A,B) must be infeasible in the average case.
Definition 2.3. We say that f is a Weak Associative One-Way Function (WAOWF) if properties P1-P6
and P8 are satisfied.
The strong non-invertibility condition (P7) requires that for any C
R
← image(f), inverting f with
respect to a given preimage A must be infeasible in the average case. However, this condition does not
say anything about weak non-invertibility (P8), which requires that computing any preimage of C must
be infeasible. In fact, the results of [17] prove that there exists an associative one-way function that is
strongly non-invertible but not weakly non-invertible.2
Thus, a WAOWF may not be a SAOWF and vice-versa. In this work, we do not enforce the weak
non-invertibility requirement. Rather, we allow the function to be weakly invertible. It turns out that
our construction of a SAOWF is strongly non-invertible, yet it is weakly invertible.
Clearly, property P7 implies that computing inverses in G must be infeasible. Since the group (G, ⋆)
is of finite order, the only way to achieve this is to keep the order of this group hidden. This is the main
idea behind our construction.
2.2 Black-Box Constructions
Although the original objective of our research was to exhibit a practical construction of a SAOWF, in this
work, we focus on a slightly different but related problem: exhibiting a practical black-box construction
of a SAOWF by extending the definition of “computation” in property P6 to include oracle computation.
In our black-box model although the group (G, ⋆) is easily samplable, we we do not have access to the
algorithm for computing f . Instead, access to the computing algorithm is only provided via a “black-box”
with public access. This is illustrated in figure 2.
However, for a black-box construction to have any practical significance it must support (a) verifiable
and (b) private computation as elaborated next.
2.3 PV-Oracles
In complexity theory, a black-box with public access is referred to as an oracle. In this work, we restrict
ourselves to constructible oracles (i.e. oracles that can be constructed using some trapdoor), since we
want our system to be practical. Additionally, to justify the use of a (constructible) oracle as one-way
function in a cryptographic protocol, we must provide the same guarantees that a real function provides.
Specifically, a real function is private and verifiable. We define similar properties for oracles. We will
restrict ourselves to an oracle that computes a binary commutative function using two inputs.
2We note that the terminology used in this paper is slightly non-standard (but more intuitive). For instance, “weak
non-invertibility” as defined here is simply referred to as “non-invertibility” in the literature [17]. Additionally, “weak” in
the literature is used to refer to non-total functions [13]. However, since we are working in finite abelian groups, we can
dispense off with definitions such as honesty, non-commutativity and totality used in [13, 14] for describing SAOWFs.
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AB
//
//
/* Algorithm for f(A,B) */
int compute(int A, int B) {
. . .
return(result);}
// f(A,B)
PRIVATE
VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION
(a) A real computable function
A
B
//
//
Blackbox
computing
f(A,B)
// f(A,B)
PUBLIC
UNVERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION
(b) A black-box with public access
Figure 2: Comparing a real and black-box computation.
Verifiable Oracles. Let f be the binary commutative function computed by an oracle. We say that
the oracle supports verifiable computation if for all A,B ∈ domain(f) and all C ∈ image(f), there
exists a PPT verification algorithm Verify that outputs 1 if C = f(A,B) and 0 otherwise. An oracle
supporting verifiable computation is called a Verifiable Oracle (V-Oracle). A V-Oracle is illustrated
in figure 3.3
A
B
GF ED
@A BCOO
//
//
Blackbox
computing
f(A,B)
f(A,B) // Verifyingalgorithm // f(A,B)
PUBLIC
VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION
Figure 3: Public, Verifiable Black-box computation (V-Oracle).
Private And Verifiable Oracles. Let f be the binary commutative function computed by a V-Oracle.
We say that the V-Oracle supports private computation if the inputs and outputs of the compu-
tation can be blinded from the V-Oracle such that the blinding algorithm provides information
theoretic [18] secrecy. Formally, there must exist two PPT algorithms Blind and Unblind as follows.
3As an example of a V-Oracle with one input, consider an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. The signing oracle
is a V-Oracle since the signature can obviously be verified.
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Blind is a randomized algorithm and takes as input an element A ∈ domain(f) and outputs a
tuple (A′, σ), where A′ ∈ domain(f) and the distributions {A} and {A′} are independent and
identical. We say that Blind is the Blinding Algorithm and σ is the Unblinding Value.
Unblind takes as input a tuple (C′, σ), where C ∈ image(f). It outputs a value C ∈ image(f) such
that the following homomorphic property holds (We call Unblind the Unblinding Algorithm).
Pr


A,B
R
← domain(f);
(A′, σ)
R
← Blind(A);
C ← Unblind(f(A′, B), σ) :
C = f(A,B)

 = 1 (1)
We call a V-Oracle supporting a private computation a Private V-Oracle (PV-Oracle). See figure 4
for an illustration of a PV-Oracle.4
unblinding
valueOO
GF ED

A
B
//
//
Blinding
algorithm
A′
B′
//
//
GF ED
@A BCOO
Blackbox
computing
f(A′ , B′)
f(A′,B′) // Verifyingalgorithm f(A′,B′) //
Unblinding
algorithm
// f(A,B)
PUBLIC
VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION
PRIVATE
VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION
Figure 4: Private and Verifiable Black-box computation (PV-Oracle).
2.4 Oracle SAOWFs (O-SAOWFs)
We now extend the definition of computation in property P6 of section 2.1 to include computation by
PV-Oracles. We call such a construction an Oracle-SAOWF (O-SAOWF) and formally define it below.
Definition 2.4. A black-box construction of a SAOWF implemented using a PV-Oracle is called an
Oracle-SAOWF (O-SAOWF). An O-SAOWF construction has four PPT “algorithms” as described below
(we use quotes here because one of the algorithms PV-Compute is not a real algorithm in the usual sense;
it involves a call to a PV-Oracle).
Setup This is a randomized algorithm and takes in as input a security parameter τ . It outputs the
system parameters params for the group (G, ⋆) and a master key master-key.
Sample This is a randomized algorithm and takes in the parameter params. It outputs a uniformly
selected element A
R
← G along with some auxiliary information σA, which we will call the sampling
information in our construction.
4As an example of a PV-Oracle with one input, consider a RSA decryption oracle w.r.t. a given RSA public key.
Information theoretic privacy for inputs to the decryption oracle can be achieved using Chaum’s blinding technique [19].
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Compute This algorithm takes as input the parameter params, the master key master-key and two values
A,B. If (A,B) /∈ G2, it sets C ← I (recall that I is the identity element). On the other hand, if
(A,B) ∈ G2 it computes C ← f(A,B) = A ⋆ B. The output is C ∈ G. We assume that master-key
acts like a trapdoor that enables computation of f .
Define a PV-Oracle O having access to master-key and implementing the compute algorithm. We assume
that master-key is not known to anybody else. The fourth algorithm involves a call to this oracle.
PV-Compute This algorithm takes as input the parameter params and two elements A,B ∈ G. It
uses the Verify, Blind and Unblind algorithms defined in section 2.3 as sub-routines to compute
C ← f(A,B) = A ⋆ B privately and verifiably by querying the PV-Oracle O that implements the
Compute procedure. It outputs C ∈ G.
2.4.1 Security Of O-SAOWFs
Assume that the PV-Compute algorithm performs correctly (that is, the Verify algorithm is correct and the
Blind/Unblind algorithms provide information theoretic secrecy). Also assume that access to the Compute
algorithm is available only in a black-box manner via oracle O that knows the parameter master-key.
We can then define the security of the O-SAOWF as follows. We say that a PPT algorithm A breaks
the O-SAOWF if it is able to “strongly invert” the O-SAOWF and compute inverses in G having only
black-box access to the Compute algorithm. We call this the Group Inversion Problem (GIPG). Formally,
the advantage of A in solving GIPG is defined as
GIP-AdvA(τ) = Pr


AO(Compute(), master-key)(P, params)→ P−1 :
(params,master-key)
R
← Setup(τ),
(P, σP )
R
← Sample(params)

 (2)
Definition 2.5. We say that algorithm A (kO, δ, ǫ)-breaks the O-SAOWF f if A runs at most time δ;
A makes at most kO adaptive queries to the oracle O implementing the Compute algorithm; and GIP-
AdvA(τ) is at least ǫ. Alternatively we say that the O-SAOWF is (kO , δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive
attack if no such algorithm A exits.
It is clear that a black-box SAOWF f where we extend the definition of computation in property
P6 to include computation by PV-Oracles, is identical to a “real” computable SAOWF f in terms of
functionality. However, until now it had been an open question to present even a black-box construction
of SAOWFs using PV-Oracles. In this work, we present the first practical construction of a black-box
SAOWF based on a PV-Oracle. In other words, our construction allows private (in the information-
theoretic sense) and verifiable computation.5
Remark 2.6. It should be noted that the above model of an O-SAOWF f that allows black-box com-
putation of the group operation ⋆ on G using a PV-Oracle is different from a black-box group, a notion
introduced by Babai and Szemere´di [20] (see also [21]), where access to the entire group (G, ⋆) is provided
through black-box routines and the representation of group elements is opaque. In contrast, the above
model is an example of a semi black-box group, since the representation of group elements is not opaque
and certain operations like blinding/unblinding, sampling and verification of composition can be done
outside of the black-box.
3 The Underlying Primitives
In this section, we give a brief overview of the two main underlying primitives of our construction: (i)
composite order bilinear maps, and (ii) the Paillier cryptosystem.
5It is noteworthy that our construction of a black-box SAOWF using a PV-Oracle also serves an existence proof of real
computable SAOWFs in a way because we achieve almost identical functionality using a black-box construction.
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3.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups both of the same order n such that computing discrete
logarithms in G1 and G2 is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map eˆ : G1 ×G1 7→ G2 that satisfies the
following properties:
1. Bilinearity: eˆ(ax, by) = eˆ(a, b)xy ∀a, b ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zn.
2. Non-degeneracy: If g is a generator of G1 then eˆ(g, g) is a generator of G2.
3. Computability: The map eˆ is efficiently computable.
The above properties also imply:
eˆ(ab, c) = eˆ(a, c) · eˆ(b, c) ∀a, b, c ∈ G1
eˆ(a, bc) = eˆ(a, b) · eˆ(a, c) ∀a, b, c ∈ G1
Additionally, we assume that it is easy to sample elements from G1. In a practical implementation,
the group G1 is the set of points on an elliptic curve and G2 is the multiplicative subgroup of a finite
field. The map eˆ is derived either from the modified Weil pairing [22, 23] or the Tate pairing [24]. We will
assume that the smallest prime factor of n is ≥ 2171 so that the fastest algorithm for computing discrete
logarithms in G1 (Pollard’s rho method [25, p.128]) takes ≥ 285 iterations [22].
3.1.1 Problems in Bilinear Maps
It is clear that irrespective of whether n is prime or composite, both G1 and G2 have generators. Fix
some generator g of G1 and define the following problems.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem [CDHP(g,G1)]: Given g
x, gy ∈ G1, output gxy ∈ G1.
Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem [DDHP(g,G1)]: Given g
x, gy, gz ∈ G1, output 1 if z = xy ∈ Zn;
otherwise output 0.
Inverse Diffie-Hellman Problem [IDHP(g,G1)]: Given g
x ∈ G1 for some x ∈ Z∗n, output g
1/x ∈ G1.
The following result was noted by Joux and Nguyen [26].
Lemma 3.1. DDHP(g,G1) (the decision Diffie-Hellman problem) is easy.
Proof. Clearly, from the properties of the mapping, z = xy ∈ Zn if and only if eˆ(g, g
z) = eˆ(gx, gy). Thus,
solving DDHP(g,G1) is equivalent to computing the mapping eˆ twice.
The next theorem shows that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is random self-reducible in
the group G if φ(n) is known.
Theorem 3.2. IDHP(g,G1) ⇒ CDHP(g,G1) if φ(n) is known.
Proof. We must show that given an IDHP(g,G1) instance g
x ∈ G1 for some x ∈ Z∗n and access to a
CDHP(g,G1) oracle, we can efficiently compute g
1/x ∈ G1. This follows from the following facts.
1. Fact. From Euler’s theorem [25, p.69] we know that ∀u ∈ Z∗n u
φ(n) ≡ 1 mod n. Equivalently,
uφ(n)−1 ≡ 1/u mod n.
2. Fact. Given any pair gu, gv ∈ G1 for arbitrary u, v ∈ N we can use the CDHP(g,G1) oracle to
compute guv ∈ G1
3. Fact. Given any value gu ∈ G1, we can use the CDHP(g,G1) oracle to compute g
u2
i
for any i ∈ N
by the “repeated squaring” method (see [27, p.23] for an example).
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Therefore, from gx we can efficiently compute h = gx
φ(n)−1
∈ G1 using the CDHP(g,G1) oracle and the
“repeated squaring and multiply” algorithm of [25, p.71] (via facts 2 and 3). Then from fact 1, h = g1/x,
and thus, h is the required solution.
Although theorem 3.2 says that IDHP(g,G1) ⇒ CDHP(g,G1) if φ(n) is known, it is not clear if the same
reduction holds when φ(n) is unknown. In light of this, we make the following hypothesis, necessary for
the security of our construction.
Conjuncture 3.1. IDHP(g,G1) 6⇒ CDHP(g,G1) if φ(n) is unknown.
3.1.2 BDH Parameter Generator
We will further assume that n = |G1| = |G2| = pq where p, q are large primes such that given the product
n = pq, factoring n is intractable. We refer the reader to [28] for details on generating composite order
bilinear maps for any given n that is square free.
Using the idea of [23], we define a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter generator as a randomized
PPT algorithm BDH that takes a single parameter τ ∈ N and outputs a tuple (eˆ, G1, G2, p, q) such that
p, q are distinct primes of τ bits each, G1, G2 are two cyclic multiplicative groups of the same order pq,
and eˆ : G1 ×G1 7→ G2 is a bilinear mapping as defined in section 3.1.
For any PPT algorithm A, denote by CDHP-AdvA(τ), the advantage of A in solving CDHP(g,G1) for
some security parameter τ . Formally,
CDHP-AdvA(τ) = Pr


A(eˆ, n,G1, G2, g, u, v) = gxy :
(eˆ, G1, G2, p, q)
R
← BDH(τ) s.t. |G1| = |G2| = pq,
n = pq, g
R
← G1 s.t. 〈g〉 = G1, (x, y)
R
← Zn
2, u = gx, v = gy

 (3)
Similarly, we denote by IDHP-AdvA(τ) the advantage of A in solving IDHP(g,G1). Formally,
IDHP-AdvA(τ) = Pr


A(eˆ, n,G1, G2, g, u) = g1/x :
(eˆ, G1, G2, p, q)
R
← BDH(τ) s.t. |G1| = |G2| = pq,
n = pq, g
R
← G1 s.t. 〈g〉 = G1, x
R
← Z∗n, u = g
x

 (4)
We will make the following two assumptions for all our constructions.
Diffie-Hellman Assumption: The computation Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP(g,G1)) is intractable.
In other words, for all PPT algorithms A, CDHP-AdvA(τ) is a negligible function of τ .
Inverse Diffie-Hellman Assumption: The inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (IDHP(g,G1)) is intractable.
In other words, for all PPT algorithms A, IDHP-AdvA(τ) is a negligible function of τ .
3.2 The Paillier Cryptosystem
Our idea of constructing the O-SAOWF is to use an oracle as a “Diffie-Hellman problem” solver in the
bilinear group G1 of composite order n. Since the only known way to solve the Diffie-Hellman problem
is to compute discrete logarithms, we provide the discrete logarithms to the oracle in an encrypted
form using an asymmetric cryptosystem. The requirement here is that the encryption algorithm E
must possess the following multiplicative homomorphic property: for any messages m1,m2 ∈ Z∗n, given
{E(m1),m2} or {m1,E(m2)}, it must be possible to compute E(m1m2 mod n) directly without knowing
the corresponding decryption algorithm D. The Paillier cryptosystem [29] has this property.6
6Although this property is necessary, it is not sufficient; the RSA [30] and Rabin [31] cryptosystems also have this
property. However, our construction based on RSA or Rabin is insecure.
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The following facts form the basis of the Paillier cryptosystem. Let n = pq, where p, q are distinct
odd primes. Let λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) and φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
1. Fact. |Z∗n2 | = nφ(n)
2. Fact. For all w ∈ Z∗n2 it is true that w
nλ ≡ 1 mod n2 and wλ ≡ 1 mod n.
3. Fact. For all w ∈ Z∗n2 it is true that (w
λ mod n2) ≡ 1 mod n. Thus the mapping L : Z∗n2 7→ Zn,
where L(w) = (w
λ mod n2)−1
n is well defined.
We are now ready to describe the Paillier cryptosystem (see [29] for details).
Key Generation: Generate p, q
R
← N, where p, q are large distinct primes. Set n ← pq and λ ←
lcm(p− 1, q − 1). Generate t
R
← Z∗n2 such that the order of t is a non-zero multiple of n. This can
be done by checking that L(tλ mod n2) is invertible in Zn. The public key is (t, n) and the private
key is (λ, n).
For convenience in this paper, we will use the notation E,D to denote the encryption and decryption
functions respectively for some fixed parameters (λ, t, n) whenever the parameters are clear from
the context.
Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, generate random r
R
← Z∗n and set
c← E(m) = tmrn mod n2
The ciphertext is c ∈ Z∗n2 .
Decrypt: To decrypt, compute
m← D(c) =
L(cλ mod n2)
L(tλ mod n2)
∈ Zn
3.2.1 Homomorphic Properties
The Paillier cryptosystem has the following homomorphic properties [29].
1. Plaintext multiplication:
∀m1,m2 ∈ Zn D(E(m1)
m2 mod n2) = D(E(m2)
m1 mod n2) = m1m2 mod n
2. Self Blinding:
∀m ∈ Zn ∀r ∈ N D(E(m)r
n mod n2) = m
The semantic security of the above encryption scheme is proved under the Decision Composite Resid-
uosity Assumption (DCRA) [29], which states that the following problem is hard unless the factors of n
are known.
Decision Composite Residousity Problem [DCRPn] Given x
R
← Z∗n2 , output 1 if ∃y ∈ Z
∗
n2 s.t.
x ≡ yn (mod n2) otherwise output 0.
The DCRA is a stronger assumption than factoring [29]. See [32, 33] for a discussion on the bit-security
of the Paillier cryptosystem.
4 Our O-SAOWF Construction
Our construction will describe the four algorithms Setup, Sample, Compute and PV-Compute defined
in section 2.4. For clarity of presentation, we give the construction in stages. First we describe the
underlying primitives of our construction and any necessary security assumptions. Next, we describe the
Setup procedure and elaborate on the structure of the group (G, ⋆) defined by params before describing
the remaining algorithms.
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4.1 Setup
This algorithm generates the system parameters. The input is a single parameter τ ∈ N.
1. Use the BDH parameter generator BDH of section 3.1.2 to output (eˆ, G1, G2, p, q) ← BDH(τ, 2),
where p, q are large distinct primes of ≈ τ bits each, G1, G2 are descriptions of two groups both of
order pq and eˆ : G1 ×G1 7→ G2 is a bilinear map (of section 3.1). Then pick a generator g
R
← G1.
2. Set n ← pq and λ ← lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Then generate an element t
R
← Z∗n2 such that the order of
t is a non-zero multiple of n. The pair (t, n) is the public key for the Paillier cryptosystem. The
corresponding private key is (λ, n). We will denote the corresponding encryption and decryption
algorithms by E and D respectively.
3. Generate α, r
R
← Z∗n. Then set h← g
α ∈ G1 and β ← E(α) = t
αrn ∈ Z∗n2 .
4. Output params ← (eˆ, G1, G2, g, t, n, h, β) and master-key ← λ.
Recall that the Compute algorithm requires as input the parameter master-key and is accessible only
as a black-box routine via oracle O that implements this algorithm. The value master-key is sent to O
via a secure channel and the value params is made public.
4.2 Description Of (G, ⋆)
From params, the tuple (eˆ, G1, G2, g, t, n) defines the structure of the group (G, ⋆) and the pair (h, β)
represents a random element of this group. We now describe the structure of this group.
1. Consider the set S ( G1 defined as
S = {x|x = gy for some y ∈ Z∗n}
Clearly, |S| = φ(n) = |Z∗n| and S is exactly the set of elements of G1 having order n.
2. Define the set G ( S× Z∗n2 as
G = {(x, y)|x = gD(y)} (5)
and define a binary operation ⋆ on G using the multi-valued mapping
f : G×G 7→ G
(A,B) 7→ A ⋆ B
as follows. Let A = (xA, yA) and B = (xB , yB). Then A ⋆ B = (xC , yC), where
xC ← xA
D(yB) = gD(yA)D(yB) = xB
D(yA) ∈ G1 (6)
yC ← E(D(yA)D(yB) mod n) ∈ Z
∗
n2 (7)
Thus, xC = g
D(yC) and therefore (xC , yC) ∈ G.
3. Finally, define an equivalence relation ∼ on G as follows. For any A,B ∈ G, where A = (xA, yA)
and B = (xB, yB), we say that A ∼ B if and only if xA = xB . This relation is symmetric, reflexive
and transitive. Thus, it indeed forms an equivalence relation.
We state without proof the following lemmas (which can be easily verified):
Lemma 4.1. For any A,B ∈ G, it is true that A⋆B ∼ B ⋆A. That is, the relation ∼ transforms ⋆ into
an commutative operation over G.
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Lemma 4.2. For any A,B,C ∈ G, it is true that (A ⋆ B) ⋆ C ∼ A ⋆ (B ⋆ C). That is, the relation ∼
transforms ⋆ into an associative operation over G.
For any A ∈ G, denote by [A] ( G the equivalence class of A with respect to the relation ∼. Therefore
we can define an equivalence class [I] ( G as follows:
[I] = {X |X ∼ (g, t) ∼ (g,E(1))}
Lemma 4.3. For any [A] ( G, there exists a unique [B] ( G such that [A] ⋆ [B] = [I]. Additionally,
[A] ⋆ [I] = [A].
It is clear from the above lemmas that the relation ∼ transforms the equivalence classes of G into an
abelian group with respect to the binary operation ⋆. The order of this group (φ(n)) is effectively hidden
from anyone who does not know the factors of n.
For any [A] ( G, let the symbol [A]i denote [A] ⋆ [A] ⋆ . . . [A] (i times). The inverse of [A] is denoted
by [A]−1. It can be trivially verified that the following are also true.
[A]i ⋆ [A]j = [A]i+j
([A]i)
j
= [A]ij
[A] ⋆ [A]−1 = [A]0 = [I]
([A]i ⋆ [B]j)
k
= [A]ik ⋆ [B]jk


∀ [A], [B] ( G
∀ i, j, k ∈ Z
We will slightly abuse notation and denote the equivalence class [A] by A. We will use = instead of
∼ to indicate that we are working with equivalence classes. For any j given elements A1, A2, . . . Aj ∈ G,
we denote A1 ⋆ A2 ⋆ . . . Aj by
j∏
i=1
Ai
4.3 Properties Of (G, ⋆)
We now enumerate some important properties of the group (G, ⋆).
1. Samplability: G is efficiently samplable. To sample from G, first generate random σ
R
← Z∗n. Then
set x← gσ ∈ G1 and y ← E(σ) ∈ Z∗n2 . We see that (x, y) ∈ G. In this case we call σ, the sampling
information of (x, y). When we say that A ∈ G has been sampled by us, we imply that the sampling
information of A is known. The sampling information acts like a trapdoor in our construction.
2. Trapdoor Computability: Let A,B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has sampled either one of A or
B can compute A ⋆ B efficiently as follows:
Let A = (xA, yA) and B = (xB , yB) be given. Additionally, we are given σA ∈ Z∗n, the sampling
information of A. That is, xA = g
σA ∈ G1 and yA = E(σA) ∈ Z
∗
n2 . To compute A⋆B, first generate
random r
R
← Z∗n. Then set x← xB
σA ∈ G1 and y ← yBσA · rn ∈ Z∗n2 .
Therefore, x = xB
D(yA) and due to the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem, we
find that y = E(σAD(yB) mod n) = E(D(yA)D(yB) mod n). Thus, (x, y) = A ⋆ B.
3. Trapdoor Strong Invertibility and Exponentiation: Let A,B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has
sampled A ∈ G can also compute A−1 ⋆ B because if σA ∈ Z∗n is the sampling information for A
then σ−1A ∈ Z
∗
n is the sampling information for A
−1. Also, for any i ∈ Z, the sampling information
for Ai ∈ G is (σA)
i ∈ Z∗n.
4. Non-computability: Let A,B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has not sampled at least one of
{A,B,A−1, B−1} cannot compute A ⋆ B without knowledge of λ.
5. Strong Non-invertibility: Let A,B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has not sampled at least one of
{A,A−1} cannot compute A−1 ⋆ B without knowledge of λ.
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6. Indistinguishability: Let (x, y) ∈ G1 × Z∗n2 be given. It is infeasible to decide if (x, y)
?
∈ G
without knowledge of λ.
7. Black-Box Computability: Let A,B ∈ G be given. Anyone knowing λ has the ability to compute
A ⋆ B using equations 7 and 6.
8. Black-Box Distinguishability: Let (x, y) ∈ G1 ×Z∗n2 be given. Anyone knowing λ, also has the
ability to decide if (x, y)
?
∈ G by virtue of equation 5.
4.4 A Concrete O-SAOWF Construction
We now describe a concrete construction of an O-SAOWF under definition 2.4. In addition to the
four main algorithms Setup, Sample, Compute, PV-Compute and the three algorithms Verify, Blind and
Unblind used as subroutines in PV-Compute, our construction has four ‘auxiliary’ algorithms Verify-In-
Group, Verify-Not-In-Group, TD-Exponentiate and V-Compute. Thus, our construction has a total of eleven
algorithms. The Setup algorithm is described in section 4.1 while the Sample algorithm is described in
section 4.3, item 1.
A-1.
Setup
Input: τ ∈ N
Step-1. Generate {eˆ, G1, G2, g, t, n, h, β, λ} as described in section 4.1.
Step-2. Set params ← (eˆ, G1, G2, g, t, n, h, β) and master-key ← λ.
Output: (params, master-key)
A-2.
Sample
Input: params
Step-1. Generate σA, r
R
← Z∗n
Step-2. Set xA ← gσA ∈ G1; yA ← tσArn mod n2 = E(σA) ∈ Z∗n2
Step-3. Set A← (xA, yA) ∈ G
Output: (A, σA) ∈ G× Z∗n [σA is the sampling information of A]
Remark 4.4. From the value params, the pair (h, β) ∈ G such that its sampling information α ∈ Z∗n is
unknown (see section 4.1).
A high level description of the Compute algorithm is given below.
A-3.
Compute
Input: (master-key, params, A,B), where A,B ∈ G1 × Z∗n2
Step-1. Use master-key = λ to decide if (A,B)
?
∈ G2 [See section 4.3, item 8]
Step-2. If (A,B) 6∈ G2, set C ← I ∈ G; otherwise, compute A ⋆ B using λ and set C ← A ⋆ B
[See section 4.3, item 7]
Output: C ∈ G
Functionality Of Oracle O: Access to Compute is provided in a black-box manner via the oracle O
that knows master-key and params. The oracle works as follows.
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Oracle O
Input: A,B ∈ G1 × Z∗n2
Step-1. Set C ← Compute(master-key, params, A,B)
Output: C ∈ G [We say C = O(A,B)]
Remark 4.5. A query to oracle O on inputs (A,B) /∈ G2 requires at most two exponentiations in G1
and Z∗n2 . On the other hand, if (A,B) ∈ G
2, the query always involves three exponentiations in G1 and
Z∗n2 . Also, O(A,B) = A ⋆ B whenever (A,B) ∈ G
2.
Remark 4.6. Assuming that access to oracle O is authentic, we can use O to decide if any given pair
(x, y)
?
∈ G. Additionally we can use O to compute Ai for any A ∈ G, i ∈ N using the “repeated squaring
and multiply” method [25, p.71].
Since access to oracle O is over an insecure public channel, we cannot assume that oracle replies are
authentic. Denote by O∗ the unauthenticated oracle (which could be an active adversary) supposedly
claiming to be oracle O.
The following algorithm Verify-In-Group uses oracle O∗ to decide that any given pair (x, y) ∈ G1×Z∗n2
is indeed an element of G. If (x, y) /∈ G the algorithm outputs 0 with a high probability.
A-4.
Verify-In-Group
Input: (params, x, y) such that (x, y) ∈ G1 × Z
∗
n2
Step-1. Generate u1, u2, v1, v2,
R
← Zn and w1, w2
R
← Z∗n
Step-2. Set x1 ← xu1gv1 ∈ G1; x2 ← xu2gv2 ∈ G1
Step-3. Set y1 ← yu1tv1w1n mod n2; y2 ← yu2tv2w2n mod n2; result← 0
Step-4. Set (x′, y′)← O∗((x1, y1), (x2, y2))
Step-5. If eˆ(x′, g) = eˆ(x1, x2), set result← 1
Output: result ∈ {0, 1}
We prove in appendix A that the above algorithm is sound (under a non-standard assumption). That
is, if (x, y) 6∈ G then the algorithm outputs 0 with a high probability. However, the converse is not true.
Hence, the above algorithm cannot be used to conclude that (x, y) /∈ G if the output is 0.
In some cases, we may need to decide with certainty that a given pair (x, y) is indeed not an element
of G. The next algorithm Verify-Not-In-Group enables us to do this using oracle O∗. If (x, y) ∈ G the
algorithm outputs 0 with a high probability.
A-5.
Verify-Not-In-Group
Input: (params, x, y) such that (x, y) ∈ G1 × Z∗n2
Step-1. Set a security parameter j and generate a j-bit string a
R
← {0, 1}j. Set result← 0.
Initialize another j-bit string b ∈ {0, 1}j.
Step-2. Repeat for i from 1 to j (denote by ai and bi, the i
th bits of a and b respectively).
i. If ai = 1, set (x
′, y′)
R
← Sample(params); otherwise, set (x′, y′)← (x, y)
ii. Set bi ← Verify-In-Group(params, x′, y′)
Step-3. If (a = b), set result← 1
Output: result ∈ {0, 1}
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The following lemma shows that the Verify-Not-In-Group algorithm is sound if the Verify-In-Group
algorithm is sound.
Lemma 4.1. If the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound then the Verify-Not-In-Group algorithm is also
sound.
Proof. We must show that if the Verify-Not-In-Group algorithm outputs 1 then (x, y) 6∈ G.
If (x, y) ∈ G, then (x′, y′) in step 2 of Verify-Not-In-Group is always an element of G. Now assume
that the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound. Thus, the probability that ai = bi is
1
2 for any i. Also, each
bit ai is independent of other bits. Thus, for a total of j bits, Pr[(ai = bi)∀1 ≤ i ≤ j] =
1
2j . In other
words, if (x, y) ∈ G the probability that the Verify-Not-In-Group algorithm outputs 1 is 12j , which can be
made arbitrarily small.
The next algorithm Verify takes as input a 3-tuple (A,B,C), where A,B ∈ G and C ∈ G1 × Z∗n2 . It
outputs 1 only if C = A ⋆ B
A-6.
Verify
Input: (params, A,B,C) such that A,B ∈ G and C ∈ G1 × Z∗n2 .
Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Set (xA, yA)← A; (xB, yB)← B; (xC , yC)← C; result← 0
Step-2. If eˆ(xC , g) = eˆ(xA, xB), set result← Verify-In-Group(params, xC , yC)
Output: result ∈ {0, 1}
Clearly, the Verify algorithm is sound if the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound. We observe that we
can remove the function call Verify-In-Group(params, xC , yC) in step 2 of the above algorithm (and simply
set result ← 1 instead) without introducing any weakness in the construction. However, including this
call enables us to reduce the soundness of other related algorithms to the soundness of the Verify-In-Group
algorithm.
Algorithm V-Compute takes as input two elements A,B ∈ G. It uses the Verify-In-Group algorithm as
a subroutine and computes A ⋆ B verifiably by querying O∗.
A-7.
V-Compute
Input: (params, A,B) such that A,B ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Set C ← O∗(A,B) ∈ G1 × Z∗n2
Step-2. If Verify(A,B,C) = 0, set C ← I ∈ G
Output: C ∈ G
Clearly, the soundness of the above algorithm reduces to the soundness of the Verify algorithm. As a
consequence, we state the following theorem which says that if the Verify algorithm is sound then having
indirect access to the oracle O via some active adversary O∗ is the same has having authentic and public
access to O.
Theorem 4.2. If the Verify algorithm is sound then O is a V-Oracle.
The next algorithm, TD-Exponentiate (“trapdoor-exponentiate”) takes as input (i) the sampling in-
formation σA ∈ Z∗n of an element A ∈ G, (ii) an arbitrary index i ∈ Z, and (iii) an element B ∈ G. It
outputs Ai ⋆ B ∈ G. TD-Exponentiate will be primarily used as a subroutine in the Blind and Unblind
algorithms.
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A-8.
TD-Exponentiate
Input: (params, σA, i, B), where σA ∈ Z∗n; i ∈ Z; B ∈ G.
Here, σA is the sampling information of A ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Generate r
R
← Z∗n
Step-2. Set σ ← σAi ∈ Z∗n; (xB , yB)← B ∈ G1 × Z
∗
n2
Step-3. Set x← xBσ ∈ G1; y ← (yB)
σ
rn = E(σD(yB) mod n) ∈ Z∗n2
Output: (x, y) ∈ G
The next two algorithms Blind and Unblind work as follows.
Blind takes as input a value A ∈ G. It generates B
R
← G and outputs (A⋆B) ∈ G, along with σB ∈ Z∗n,
the sampling information of B. Unblind is the inverse of Blind. It takes as input an pair (A, σB) ∈ G×Z∗n
and outputs A ⋆ B−1 ∈ G such that σB is the sampling information of B ∈ G.
A-9.
Blind
Input: (params, A) such that A ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Set (B, σB)
R
← Sample(params) ∈ G× Z∗n [B will be ignored]
Step-2. Set (x, y)← TD-Exponentiate(params, σB , 1, A) ∈ G
Output: (x, y, σB) ∈ G× Z∗n
A-10.
Unblind
Input: (params, A, σB), where A ∈ G and σB ∈ Z∗n.
Here, σB is the sampling information of B ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Set (x, y)← TD-Exponentiate(params, σB ,−1, A) ∈ G
Output: (x, y) ∈ G
Lemma 4.3. The Blind/Unblind algorithms provide information theoretic secrecy.
Proof. Clearly, the Blind and Unblind algorithms are inverses of each other. Now, if the output of the
Sample algorithm is uniformly distributed over G then the output of the Blind algorithm is also uniformly
distributed over G, independent of the input.
Algorithm PV-Compute takes as inputs A,B ∈ G. It uses the Blind, Unblind and and V-Compute
algorithms as subroutines to compute A ⋆ B privately and verifiably.
A-11.
PV-Compute
Input: (params, A,B) such that A,B ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Set (A′, σA′)
R
← Blind(params, A) ∈ G× Z∗n
Step-2. Set (B′, σB′)
R
← Blind(params, B) ∈ G× Z∗n
Step-3. Set C′ ← V-Compute(A′, B′) ∈ G1 × Z∗n2
Step-4. Set C ← Unblind(params,Unblind(params, C′, σA′), σB′) ∈ G
Output: C ∈ G
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Since the Blind/Unblind algorithms provide information theoretic secrecy (lemma 4.3), the soundness
of the above algorithm also reduces to the soundness of the Verify algorithm. As a consequence, we state
the following theorem which says that if the Verify algorithm is sound then having indirect access to the
oracle O via some active adversary O∗ is the same has having private and authentic access to O.
Theorem 4.4. If the Verify algorithm is sound then O is a PV-Oracle.
This completes our O-SAOWF construction. Figure 5 gives the dependencies between the eleven
algorithms. We can essentially use PV-Compute(A,B) to denote f(A,B), where f is a real SAOWF
defined using (G, ⋆) in section 2.1. When considering the security, we will assume that O takes one time
unit to respond to each query and that the sum of the number of queries to O and the running time of
an adversary attacking the O-SAOWF is bounded by a polynomial in τ .
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Figure 5: Dependencies between the algorithms.
4.5 Notation
For convenience we will adopt the following shorthand notation.
1. We will denote TD-Exponentiate(params, σA, i, B) by T (σA, i, B).
2. Since invoking V-Compute is equivalent to making a public query to oracle O (Theorem 4.2), we
will denote V-Compute(params, A,B) simply by O(A,B).
3. Invoking PV-Compute is equivalent to making a private query to oracle O (Theorem 4.4). We will
denote PV-Compute(params, A,B) by Ô(A,B).
4. For any set of k elements {A1, A2, . . . Ak} ⊂ G, we denote by
〈
O
〉k
i=1
(Ai) the value
O(O(. . .O(A1, A2), . . .), Ak) =
k∏
i=1
Ai
Similarly, we denote by
〈
Ô
〉k
i=1
(Ai) the value
Ô(Ô(. . . Ô(A1, A2), . . .), Ak) =
k∏
i=1
Ai
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5. We will denote by E(A, i) an algorithm to compute Ai for any A ∈ G with the repeated squaring
method using V-Compute as a subroutine. This algorithm does not provide privacy of inputs.
However, the outputs are verifiable.
6. We will denote by Ê(A, i) an algorithm to compute Ai for any A ∈ G with the repeated squaring
method using PV-Compute as a subroutine. This algorithm provides information theoretic privacy
of inputs and verifiability of outputs.
Remark 4.7. Computing Ai using algorithms E and Ê will amount to ≈ c · log(i) queries to oracle O
(for constant c) with the repeated squaring method [25, p.71].
4.6 Security Of The Construction
The oracle is primarily used as a “computing device” in the proofs. We assume that the oracle always
functions correctly and keeps the trapdoor information λ secret. Recall that out of params, the pair
(h, β) ∈ G. Denote this value by P . The security of our O-SAOWF relies on the difficulty of inverting ⋆
with respect to P . One way to do this would be to extract λ from the oracle. However, this is equivalent
to factoring n so we should look at indirect methods for inverting ⋆ (with respect to P ) using the oracle.
The security of all our constructions reduces to the difficulty of the following problem:
Group Inversion Problem [GIPG]: Let P = (h, β)
R
← G be uniformly sampled using secret α
R
← Z∗n
such that h = gα ∈ G1 and β = E(α) ∈ Z∗n2 . Given P , compute P
−1 = (h′, β′) ∈ G, where
h′ = g1/α ∈ G1 and β′ = E(1/α) ∈ Z∗n2 , possibly by using the oracle O.
Computing h′ becomes an instance of the inverse Diffie-Hellman problem IDHP(g,G1) defined in sec-
tion 3.1, which is believed to be hard even if the Diffie-Hellman problem is easy. We hypothesize that
any method of reducing IDHP(g,G1) to CDHP(g,G1) will yield a method of reducing GIPG to the oracle
O. We define the advantage of an algorithm for solving the group inversion problem as follows.
Definition 4.8. For any algorithm A, the advantage of A in solving the group inversion problem GIP-
AdvA(τ) for some security parameter τ is defined as:
GIP-AdvA(τ) = Pr


AO(λ)(eˆ, G1, G2, n, g, t, h, β) = (g1/α,E(1/α)) :
(eˆ, G1, G2, p, q)
R
← BDH(τ) s.t. |G1| = |G2| = pq,
n = pq, α
R
← Z∗n, g
R
← G1 s.t. 〈g〉 = G1,
t
R
← Z∗n2 s.t. | 〈t〉 | = nλ, h = g
α, β = E(α)


(8)
Here BDH is the BDH parameter generator algorithm (section 3.1.2); E denotes the Paillier en-
cryption algorithm with public key (t, n) (section 3.2), and O is an oracle implementing the Compute
algorithm (section 4.4).
For any algorithm A, let δA denote the upper-bound on the running time of A, and let k(O,A) denote
the upper-bound on the number of queries to oracle O by A. Our security is based on the following
conjuncture.
Conjuncture 4.9. For any algorithm A such that k(O,A), δA ∈ Poly(τ), GIP-AdvA(τ) is a negligible
function in τ . In other words, for all kO, δ, 1/ǫ ∈ Poly(τ), the O-SAOWF is (kO, δ, ǫ)-secure under an
adaptive attack using definition 2.5.
5 Applications Of O-SAOWFs
In this section we describe three applications of O-SAOWFs: (a) Multiparty-Key Agreement, (b) Signa-
tures and (c) Broadcast encryption (another application, Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is described
in appendix B).
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5.1 Key Generation (Setup PKI)
To participate in the protocols, each user i must have a certified public key and the corresponding private
key. This is generated as follows. Recall that out of params, the pair (h, β) = P ∈ G. This will serve as
a common starting value for all users.
1. User i generates (Xi, σXi)
R
← Sample(params) ∈ G× Z∗n. The private key is σXi .
2. User i computes the public key Yi ← T (σXi , 1, P ) = Xi ⋆ P . The public key is made available in
an authentic way.
5.2 Multiparty Key Agreement
In this section, we describe the multiparty key agreement protocol of Rivest, Rabi and Sherman [6] using
O-SAOWFs. At a high level, the objective of a multiparty key agreement protocol is to enable a set of
users to compute a shared secret key (the group private key) such that no one outside the set can compute
this key. In our model each group private key also has a corresponding group public key, which can be
used for join/merge operations and for verifying (group) signatures created using the group private key.
Our construction also defines a partial public key that is used in the intermediate steps for group private
key computation.
5.2.1 Key Agreement Protocol
[k users] A set s = {1, 2, 3 . . . k} of k users compute a shared group key.
1. Partial public key: Each user j ∈ s first computes the partial public key
Ys\{j} ←
〈
O
〉k
i=1;i6=j
(Yi) =
k∏
i=1;i6=j
Yi = P
k−1 ⋆
k∏
i=1;i6=j
Xi
2. Group Private Key: Each user j ∈ s then computes the group private key
Ks ← T (σXj , 1, Ys\{j}) = Xj ⋆ Ys\{j} = P
k−1 ⋆
k∏
i=1
Xi
3. Group Public Key: The group public key for s is computed by anyone as
Ys ←
〈
O
〉k
i=1
(Yi) =
k∏
i=1
Yi = P
k ⋆
k∏
i=1
Xi
Thus, the partial public key of user j in set s is the group public key of the set s\{j}.
5.2.2 Overview Of The Key Agreement Protocol
1. Complexity: For a group of k users, k − 2 oracle queried are required for each user to compute the
shared key. Thus, total k(k−2) queries are required for all the k users. However, no specific ordering
is required between the users (users can compute the shared key after receiving a ciphertext).
Additionally, oracle queries can be batched.
2. Universal Escrow : Given a public key Yi = Xi ⋆ P , the oracle O can compute the corresponding
private key σXi . Therefore, O has universal escrow capability.
3. Non-interactivity: Assuming that all the public keys Yi are known in advance, any user can compute
the shared key without interacting with the other users.
4. Multiple copies of the Oracle: An arbitrary number of “copies” of the oracle can be run without
any compromise in security.
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5.2.3 Join And Merge Operations
Clearly, members can join any group and many groups can merge arbitrarily. For simplicity we only
demonstrate the merge operation between two disjoint sets a and b of users.
Example [Merge] A set a of users merges with another set b of users such that a ∩ b = ∅. Further
assume that a has the private key Ka and the public key Ya. Similarly, b has the private key Kb and the
public key Yb
1. Group private key: Each member i ∈ a computes Ka∪b ← Ô(Ka, Yb), while each member j ∈ b
computes Ka∪b ← Ô(Kb, Ya).
2. Group public key: The group public key corresponding to the group private key Ka∪b can be
computed as Ya∪b ← O(Ya, Yb) = Ya ⋆ Yb.
In the above merge procedure, we assumed that a and b are disjoint (i.e. they have no common members).
In case the sets are not disjoint, we could still use the above merge procedure without any serious drawback
as long as this instantiation of O-SAOWF is only used for key agreement (and not for signatures, which are
discussed below in section 5.3). In case the same instantiation of O-SAOWF is also used for signatures, we
would require the merge procedure to eliminate duplicate users in the merged set (this can be efficiently
done if the intermediate values in the partial public key computation are cached).
5.2.4 Forward Secrecy
Due to the above mentioned merge procedure, the compromise of the group private key of a set a of users
compromises the group private key of any other set c of users whenever c ) a. To overcome this weakness,
if the private key of group a is compromised, at least one member of a must compute a new public-private
key pair. Compromise of a group private key of a set a of users, however, does not compromise the group
private key of any set c of users whenever c ( a.
5.2.5 Security Of The Key Agreement Protocol
From the key agreement procedure, it is clear that if the adversary knows the private key of user i ∈ a
then the adversary knows the group private key of the set a of users. Additionally, if the adversary knows
the group private key of the set a then the adversary also knows the group private key of any set that
properly includes a. Thus, we restrict the adversary to output the private key of any set a of users such
that the adversary knows neither the group private key of any proper subset of a nor the private keys
of any users in the set a. We show that any algorithm that breaks the above key agreement protocol
(with the above restriction) can be used to compute P−1. First observe that the secret key Ka for the
set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of users is related to the public keys {Y1, Y2, . . . Yk} as:
Ka = P
k−1
k∏
i=1
Xi = P
−1 ⋆
k∏
i=1
Yi (9)
We use the security model of security of multiparty key agreement similar to the one used in [7],
namely security under a one-time key attack. The difference here is that we allow the attacker to choose
the set of public keys to attack. Formally, we define a one-time key attack on a multiparty key agreement
using game 1.
Game 1
Initialize. To initialize the game, the challenger gives a security parameter τ to the adversary.
The adversary A responds with a value µ1 ∈ N
Challenge. The challenger C performs the key generation phase and gives a set {Y1, Y2, . . . Yµ1}
of µ1 public keys to A.
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Output. Eventually A outputs a pair 〈a,Ka〉.
Result: A wins the game if a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ1} and Ka is the group private key of a.
Definition 5.1. We say that adversary A (µ1, δ1, ǫ1)-breaks the key agreement protocol in an one-time
key attack if for a total of µ1 public keys output in the setup phase A runs at most time δ1 and the
probability of A winning game 1 is at least ǫ1. Alternatively we say that the key agreement protocol is
(µ1, δ1, ǫ1)-secure under a one-time key attack if no such adversary exists.
The next theorem shows that the key agreement protocol is secure under a one-time key attack if the
group inversion problem is hard.
Theorem 5.1. Let the O-SAOWF be (·, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack. Then the multiparty key
agreement protocol is (µ1, δ1, ǫ1)-secure in a one-time key attack, where δ ≤ δ1 + Θ(c1µ1); and ǫ = ǫ1.
Here, c1 is the time for a multiplication in Z
∗
n.
Proof. Let the O-SAOWF be (·, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack and let A be an algorithm that
(µ1, δ1, ǫ1)-breaks the key agreement protocol in a one-time key attack. We construct an algorithm B
that uses A to solve GIPG in at most δ time with probability at least ǫ, thus arriving at a contradiction.
The input to B is P ∈ G and its goal is to output P−1. B simulates the challenger of game 1 and runs
algorithm A as follows.
Initialize. B gives the security parameter τ to A who replies with µ1.
Challenge. B generates (Y1, σY1), (Y2, σY2), . . . (Yµ1 , σYµ1 )
R
← Sample(params) ∈ G × Z∗n and gives
the (µ1 + 1)-tuple (Y1, Y2, . . . Yµ1 , P ) to A.
Output. Eventually A outputs a pair 〈a,Ka〉.
Result: If 〈a,Ka〉 is a winning configuration, then a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ1} and Ka = P−1 ⋆
∏
i∈a Yi by
virtue of equation 9. Algorithm B then proceeds as follows:
(a) If 〈a,Ka〉 is not a winning configuration, B reports failure and terminates.
(b) We know that 〈a,Ka〉 is a winning configuration. Algorithm B sets σY ←
∏
i∈a σYi mod n.
Thus, σY is the sampling information of
∏
i∈a Yi (see section 4.3, item 3).
(c) B sets result← T (σY ,−1,Ka) and outputs result.
Algorithm B is correct because
T (σY ,−1,Ka) = (
∏
i∈a
Yi)
−1
⋆ Ka = (
∏
i∈a
Yi)
−1
⋆ P−1 ⋆
∏
i∈a
Yi = P
−1
The running time of B is the running time of A plus the time required for generating the µ1 public
keys; the time required for computing T ; and the time required for at most µ1 multiplications in Z
∗
n.
The probability of B’s success is the same as the probability of A’s success. This gives the bounds.
5.3 Signatures
As noted in [10], SAOWFs give rise to signature schemes. Here, we describe two signature schemes
using O-SAOWFs: ordinary signatures and multi-user signatures. A signature scheme consists of three
algorithms KeyGen, Sign and VerifySig, where the algorithms have their usual constraints [22]. Our
message space is N.
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5.3.1 Single-User Signatures
This is a variation of the scheme for single-user signatures described in [6].
KeyGen. This algorithm is described in section 5.1. The private key of user i is σXi ∈ Z
∗
n. The
public key is Yi = Xi ⋆ P ∈ G.
Sign. Let m ∈ N be the message. To sign m, user i computes the signature S(i,m) as:
S(i,m) ← T (σXi ,m, P ) = Xi
m ⋆ P
VerifySig. To verify a signature S(i,m) of user i on message m, we check if the following holds:
E(Yi,m)
?
= O(S(i,m), E(P,m− 1))
In other words, we check if Yi
m ?= S(i.m) ⋆ P
m−1
5.3.2 Multi-User And Ring Signatures
The above construction of single-user signatures can be trivially extended to multi-user signatures. To
sign messages, members of a group must share a secret group key.
KeyGen. This algorithm is described in section 5.2. Without loss of generality, assume that any of
the set a = {1, 2, . . . j} of users want to independently sign messages using the group private
key Ka = P
j−1 ⋆
∏j
i=1Xi such that the signatures can be verified using the group public key
Ya =
∏j
i=1 Yi.
Sign. Let m ∈ N be the message. To sign m, any member i ∈ a computes the signature S(a,m) as:
S(a,m) ← Ô(Ê(Ka,m), P ) = Ka
m ⋆ P
VerifySig. To verify a signature S(a,m) of user i ∈ a on message m, we check if the following holds:
E(Ya,m)
?
= O(S(a,m), E(P,m− 1))
In other words, we check if Ya
m ?= S(a,m) ⋆ P
m−1
Given a signature of some set a, it is not possible for any group controller to revoke the anonymity of
the signer (since there is no group controller). Thus, the above scheme is an example of ring signatures [34].
5.3.3 Security Of The Signature Schemes
The strongest model for security of signatures is security against existential forgery under an adaptive
chosen message attack [22], where the attacker is required to output a successful forgery under the
challenge public key after having access to the signing oracle. However, we only prove the security of our
schemes in a weaker model that we call security against existential forgery under a non-adaptive chosen
message attack. In a non-adaptive attack, the attacker is not allowed to make any signature queries. We
define this using the following game between the challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 2
Initialize. To initialize the game, the challenger gives a security parameter τ to the adversary.
The adversary A outputs µ2 ∈ N.
Challenge. The challenger C performs the key generation phase and gives a set {Y1, Y2, . . . Yµ2}
of µ2 public keys to A.
Output. Eventually A outputs a tuple
〈
a, S(a,m),m
〉
.
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Result: A wins the game if a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ2} and S(a,m) is a valid signature by a on the message m.
Definition 5.2. We say that adversary A (µ2, δ2, ǫ2)-breaks the signature scheme in a non-adaptive
chosen message attack if for a total of µ2 public keys output in the setup phase A runs at most time δ2
and the probability of A winning game 2 is at least ǫ2. Alternatively we say that the signature scheme is
(µ2, δ2, ǫ2)-secure under a non-adaptive chosen message attack if no such adversary exists.
The next theorem shows that any algorithm that is successful in existential forgery of signatures under
a non-adaptive chosen message attack can be used to compute P−1. First observe that S(a,m) can be
rewritten as
S(a,m) = Ka
m ⋆ P = P 1−m ⋆ (
j∏
i=1
Yi)
m
(10)
Also note that Game 2 considers both single and multi-user signatures.
Theorem 5.2. Let the O-SAOWF be (kO, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack. Then the signature
scheme is (µ2, δ2, ǫ2)-secure under a non-adaptive chosen message attack, where kO ≤ c2 log(n); δ ≤
δ2 +Θ(µ2); and ǫ ≥ ǫ2. Here, c2 is a constant.
Proof. Let the O-SAOWF be (kO, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack and let A be an algorithm that
(µ2, δ2, ǫ2)-breaks the signature scheme in a non-adaptive chosen message attack. We construct an al-
gorithm B that uses A to solve GIPG in at most δ time with probability at least ǫ, thus arriving at a
contradiction. The input to B is P ∈ G and its goal is to output P−1. B simulates the challenger of game
2 and runs algorithm A.
Initialize. B gives the parameter τ to A, who outputs µ2 ∈ N.
Challenge. B generates (Y1, σY1), (Y2, σY2), . . . (Yj , σYµ2 )
R
← Sample(params) ∈ G × Z∗n and gives
the (µ2 + 1)-tuple (Y1, Y2, . . . Yµ2 , P ) as the input to A.
Output. Finally A outputs a tuple
〈
a, S(a,m),m
〉
.
Result: If the tuple
〈
a, S(a,m),m
〉
represents a winning configuration, then a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ2} and
S(a,m) = P
1−m ⋆ (
∏
i∈a Yi)
m by virtue of equation 10. Algorithm B then proceeds as follows:
(a) If
〈
a, S(a,m),m
〉
not a winning configuration, algorithm B reports failure and terminates.
(b) We know that a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ2} and S(a,m) = P
1−m ⋆ (
∏
i∈a Yi)
m
. Algorithm B then sets
C ← E(P,m − 2) = Pm−2 and σY ←
∏
i∈a σYi mod n. Thus, σY is the sampling information
of
∏
i∈a Yi (see section 4.3, item 3).
(c) Finally, B sets result← T (σY ,−m,O(S(a,m), C)) and outputs result.
Algorithm B is correct because
T (σY ,−m,O(S(a,m), C)) = (
∏
i∈a
Yi)
−m
⋆ S(a,m) ⋆ C
= (
∏
i∈a
Yi)
−m
⋆ (P 1−m ⋆
∏
i∈a
Yi) ⋆ (P
m−2) = P−1
The running time of B is the running time of A plus the time required for generating the µ2 public
keys; the time required for computing T ; and the time required for at most µ2 multiplications in Z∗n.
The probability of B’s success is the same as the probability of A’s success. Finally, B queries the oracle
for computing O(S(a,m), C) and E(P,m− 2). This amounts to a maximum of c2 log(n) queries for some
constant c2. Thus, we have the required bounds.
23
5.4 Broadcast Encryption
In a broadcast encryption scheme [35], anyone can encrypt a message addressed to a closed set of users
using their public keys such that only those users have the ability to decrypt the message (we do not con-
sider schemes that allow traitor tracing [36]). Using our method, the size of ciphertexts and public/private
keys is O(1) and for a set of k users, a total of O(k) calls to the oracle O are required for encryption
and decryption. A broadcast encryption scheme consists of three algorithms KeyGen, BC-Encrypt and
BC-Decrypt, where the algorithms have their usual constraints [35]. (We use the prefix ‘BC’ to indicate
‘broadcast’).
KeyGen. This algorithm is described in section 5.2. Without loss of generality, assume that mes-
sages will be encrypted to any arbitrary set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of k users with public keys
{Y1, Y2, . . . Yk}. The sender of the message generates the group public key Ya by making k− 1
oracle queries as follows:
Ya ←
〈
O
〉k
i=1
(Yi) =
k∏
i=1
Yi = P
k ⋆
k∏
i=1
Xi
and any receiver i ∈ a must independently compute the group private key Ka by making k− 2
oracle queries as follows:
Ka ← T (σXj , 1,
k∏
i=1;i6=j
Yi) = P
k−1 ⋆
k∏
i=1
Xi
We additionally require a cryptographic hash function H1 : G1 7→ {0, 1}
l, that will be treated
as a random oracle in the proofs.7 Our message space is {0, 1}l.
BC-Encrypt. To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}l to the set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of k users with group public key
Ya, generate (R, σR)
R
← Sample(params) ∈ G× Z∗n and compute
c1 ← m⊕H(T (σR, 1, Ya)) = m⊕H(R ⋆ Ya)
C2 ← T (σR, 1, P ) = R ⋆ P
Here ⊕ denotes the XOR operator. The ciphertext is C = (c1, C2) ∈ {0, 1}l ×G.
BC-Decrypt. To decrypt ciphertext (c1, C2) using group private key Ka, compute
m← c1 ⊕H(Ô(Ka, C2)) = c1 ⊕H(Ka ⋆ C2)
The decryption is correct, because for a legitimate ciphertext we have
(Ka ⋆ C2) = (P
k−1 ⋆
k∏
i=1
Xi) ⋆ (R ⋆ P ) = R ⋆ P
k ⋆
k∏
i=1
Xi = R ⋆ Ya
5.4.1 Security Of Broadcast Encryption
We use a restricted model for security called security under an adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA). In this model, we fix some arbitrary set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of k users and require the adversary to
attack the semantic security of the scheme without access to a decryption oracle. However, we allow the
adversary to choose the subset of keys it is attacking. Since full security in the sense of adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) in the random oracle model can be achieved using the Fujisaki-Okamoto
transformation [37], we only prove security in the IND-CPA model. IND-CPA security of a broadcast
encryption scheme is defined using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
7To construct this hash function, let A = (x, y) ∈ G ∈ G1 × Z∗n be some input and let H1 : G1 7→ {0, 1}
l be a hash
function. Then H(A) = H1(x).
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Game 3
Initialize. The challenger C gives a security parameter τ to the adversary A, who outputs a tuple
µ3. The challenger performs the key generation phase and gives a set {Y1, Y2, . . . Yµ3} of µ3
public keys to A.
Challenge. A generates two messages m0,m1 along with a set a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ3} of users. The
challenger chooses a bit b
R
← {0, 1} and outputs the encryption of mb under the group public
key Ya of a.
Guess. Eventually A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}
Result: A wins the game if b = b′.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-CPA adversary. We define A’s advantage in attacking
the broadcast encryption scheme Adv-cpaA(τ) as:
Adv-cpaA(τ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the random coin tosses of C and A.
Definition 5.3. Let H be a random oracle. We say that an IND-CPA adversary A (µ3, δ3, k3, ǫ3)-breaks
the broadcast encryption scheme in a adaptive chosen plaintext attack if for a total of µ3 public keys
output in the setup phase A runs at most time δ3; A makes at most k3 queries to the oracle for H; and
Adv-cpaA(τ) at least ǫ3. Alternatively we say that the broadcast encryption scheme is (µ3, δ3, k3, ǫ3)-secure
under a adaptive chosen plaintext attack if no such adversary A exists.
The next theorem shows that any IND-CPA adversaryA with non-negligible advantage Adv-cpaA(τ) in
the random oracle model can be used to solve the group inversion problem with non-negligible advantage.
The proof is similar to the proof of [23, lemma 4.3]
Theorem 5.3. Let H be a random oracle and let the O-SAOWF be (·, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive
attack. Then the broadcast encryption scheme is (µ3, δ3, k3, ǫ3)-secure under an adaptive chosen plaintext
attack, where δ ≤ δ3 + Θ(c1µ3) + Θ(c2k3); and ǫ ≥ 2 · ǫ3. Here, c1 is the time for one multiplication in
Z∗n, and c2 is a constant that depends on the oracle O.
Proof. Let the O-SAOWF be (·, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack and let A be an algorithm that
(µ3, δ3, k3, ǫ3)-breaks the key agreement protocol in an adaptive chosen plaintext attack. We construct
an algorithm B that uses A to solve GIPG in at most δ time with probability at least ǫ, thus arriving at
a contradiction. The input to B is P ∈ G and its goal is to output P−1. B simulates the challenger of
game 3 and runs A.
Initialize. B gives the security parameter τ to A who replies with µ3. B generates
(Y1, σY1), (Y2, σY2), . . . (Yµ3 , σYµ3 )
R
← Sample(params) ∈ G× Z∗n,
and gives the (µ3 + 1)-tuple (Y1, Y2, . . . Yµ3 , P ) to A.
H-queries. At any time, A may query the random oracle H. To respond to these queries, B
maintains a list of tuples called the Hlist. Each entry in this list is a tuple of the form
〈Zj ,Hj〉. Initially this list is empty. To respond to a H query on Zi, algorithm B does the
following:
(a) If the query Zi already appears on the Hlist in a tuple 〈Zi,Hi〉, then B responds with
H(Zi) = Hi.
(b) Otherwise, B just picks a random string Hi ∈ {0, 1}l and adds the tuple 〈Zi,Hi〉 to the
Hlist. It responds with H(Zi) = Hi.
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Challenge. A generates two messages m0,m1 along with a set a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ3} and sends the
tuple (m0,m1, a) to B. Algorithm B picks random c1 ∈ {0, 1}l; generates (C2, σC2)
R
← Sample;
defines the C = (c1, C2); and gives C as the challenge ciphertext to A. Observe that the
decryption of C is c1 ⊕H(P−1 ⋆ C2 ⋆
∏
i∈a Yi).
Algorithm B also computes σW ← σC2 ·
∏
i∈a σYi mod n. Clearly, σW is the sampling infor-
mation of W = C2 ⋆
∏
i∈a Yi (see section 4.3, item 3).
Guess. Eventually A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. At this point, B searches the Hlist to find a tuple
〈Zj ,Hj〉 such that
O(Zj , P ) = W (11)
If such a tuple does not exist in the Hlist, algorithm B reports failure and terminates. Other-
wise, B sets result ← T (σW ,−1, Zj) = W−1 ⋆ Zj . Algorithm B outputs result as the solution
to the GIPG instance.
Clearly, the simulation provided by algorithm B is sound. Therefore, from claims 1 and 2 in the proof
of [23, lemma 4.2], we can conclude that
Pr
[
a tuple 〈Zj,Hj〉 appears in the H
list such that equation 11 is satisfied
]
≥ 2 · ǫ3
Thus, ǫ ≥ 2 · ǫ3. The running time of B is the running time of A plus the time required for generating
the µ3 public keys; the time required for computing T ; the time required for searching up to k3 entries in
the Hlist; and the time required for at most µ3 multiplications in Z∗n. Thus, δ ≤ δ3 +Θ(c1µ3) +Θ(c2k3),
where c1 is the time for one multiplication in Z
∗
n, and c2 is the time for checking one entry of the H
list.
Thus, we have the required bounds
6 Implementation And Efficiency
In this section, we will briefly touch upon issues relating to implementation and efficiency of our primitive.
Although our construction of O-SAOWF has other applications as demonstrated, we feel that its primary
use will be for highly dynamic group key agreement in applications like “secure chat”. Our system offers
the advantage that the group key need not be precomputed for communication between group members.
Thus, there is no specific ordering between the users.
6.1 Key Size
Factoring n enables an attacker to solve GIPG. Based on the current state of the art factoring algorithms,
we suggest using the modulus n of about 313 decimal digits (≈ 1024 bits) for moderate security applica-
tions.8 This also makes computing discrete logarithms in G1 intractable using Pollard’s rho method [25,
p.128]. Using these parameters elements of G can be represented with at most ≈ 384 bytes. The public
keys Yi of section 5.1, which are elements of G will be 384 bytes each. The private keys σXi on the other
hand, which are elements of Z∗n will be 128 bytes.
6.2 Query Overhead
In all the above protocols, we have been working in the equivalence classes of G rather than the individual
elements themselves. For any A = (x, y) ∈ G, the equivalence class [A] is completely characterized by the
first element x. The second element y is used only as an ‘auxiliary’ input for the oracle, and is useless
to anyone who does not know the factorization of n. Thus, verification of the second element cannot
provide additional security. With this consideration in mind, we slightly modify the Verify algorithm of
section 4.4 and remove the call to the Verify-In-Group subroutine, since computing the bilinear pairing
allows verification of the first element x. The computation overhead is given in table 1.
8See the RSA factoring challenge (http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2092) and the article “TWIRL and
RSA key size” (http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004). It is thought that 1024 bit keys will be secure till
the year 2010 while 2048 bit keys will be secure till the year 2030.
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Algorithm Exp G1 Exp Z
∗
n2 Multi Z
∗
n2 Multi Z
∗
n Pairing
Compute 3 4 1 2 -
V-Compute 3 4 1 2 1
PV-Compute 5 5 1 2 1
Table 1: Computation involved in a query
6.3 Batch Queries
For increased efficiency in partial public key computation, we will assume that calls to the oracle can be
batched as follows, for any i inputs A1, A2, . . . Ai ∈ G, the oracle outputs A1 ⋆ A2 ⋆ . . .Ai. In this case,
for key computation in a group of m users each user must make a batch call requiring a message of size
O(m) bits to be sent to the oracle. The reply of the oracle constitutes just one element of size O(1).
However, we lose the ability to verify the output of the oracle in a “batch query”.
6.4 Verifiability Of The Oracle
If verifiability of the oracle is not required (i.e. we need protection only from passive adversaries) then
instead of the bilinear group G1, we can use a finite field having a multiplicative subgroup of order n.
The set S defined in section 4.2 is then the φ(n) elements of this field of order n.
6.5 Fast Paillier Decryption
Since each computation of ⋆ requires two decryptions, it is desirable to obtain a faster decryption proce-
dure. In [29, section 6], a fast variant of the Paillier cryptosystem is presented where decryption does not
require the factors of n and runs with almost quadratic complexity. In this variant, λ = (p − 1)(q − 1)
has a large prime factor ν. The public key is (t, n) such that the order of t ∈ Z∗n2 is νn. The private key
is ν. Encryption and decryption is described below.
Encrypt Plaintext is m ∈ Zn. Generate r
R
← Z∗n and compute c = t
m+nr mod n2. The ciphertext is c.
Decrypt Ciphertext is c ∈ Z∗n2 . Compute m =
L(cν mod n2)
L(tν mod n2) mod n.
Semantic security of this variant does not depend on the DCRA assumption (section 3.2) but instead
relies on the weaker Decisional Partial Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DPDLA) [29, theorem 20], which
states that the following problem is hard.
Decisional Partial Discrete Logarithm Problem (DPDLP(t,n)) Fix any t ∈ Z
∗
n2 such that the
order of t is νn for unknown ν. Given w ∈ 〈t〉 and x ∈ Zn, output 1 if ∃y ∈ Z∗n s.t w ≡ t
xyn
(mod n2) otherwise output 0.
6.6 Decentralizing The Oracle
Distributing the oracle is desirable, since each oracle call involves 3 exponentiations in G1 (irrespective of
the decryption algorithm). It is possible to share the Paillier decryption key (known only to the oracle)
between different trusted authorities with the weakness that compromise of even one would compromise
the entire system. We close this section with a comparison of our scheme with previously proposed group
key agreement methods in table 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a practical implementation of a new cryptographic primitive known as an
Oracle Strong Associative One-Way Function (O-SAOWF). As some practical applications of this prim-
itive, we presented a one-round key agreement scheme for dynamic ad-hoc groups based on the protocol
due to Rabi and Sherman [6].
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Membership size is m O-SAOWF GDH basic [5] AGKE [38] GKE[39]
Number of rounds 1 m− 1
sequential
2
sequential
2
sequential
Synchronization
ordering needed?
No Yes Yes Yes
Controller needed? No No Yes (initial key
distribution)
Yes (group key
distribution)
Interaction needed? No Yes Yes Yes (for
synchronization)
Key Agreement
method
Oracle Self
(interactive)
Self
(broadcast)
Controller
Message size per
user (sent)∗
(m− 1)k1 (m− 1)k2 k3 (broadcast
only, otherwise
mk3
2k4 (to
controller)
Message size per
user (rcvd)∗
k1 (no verification),
otherwise
(m− 2)k1
(m− 1)k2 mk3 k4
Merge with m1 users 1 round
(total 2(m+m1)
messages)
O(m+m1)
rounds
(fresh key)
2 rounds
(total m+m1
broadcasts)
2 rounds
(total 2m1 +m
messages)
Part with m1 users no oracle calls
needed if partial
keys are cached
O(m−m1)
rounds
(fresh key)
2 rounds (m−m1
to m+m1
broadcasts)
1 round
(total m−m1
messages)
Partial Public
keys reusable ?
Yes No No No
Optimization
Possible?
Yes∗∗ Not likely Not likely Not likely
Protection under
active attack
Yes#
(Verifiable Oracle)
Susceptible to a
man-in-the-
middle attack
Authentication
after 2nd
round
Insecure under an
active attack [40]
Protection under
passive attack
Group Inversion
Problem
Diffie-Hellman
Problem
Diffie-Hellman
Problem
Diffie-Hellman
Problem
* We assume that k1, k2 . . . kn are constants.
** Assuming that intermediate controllers are used and partial public keys are cached.
# If public keys are known in advance, the verifiability of the oracle ensures implicit group key authentication.
Table 2: Comparison of our group key agreement scheme
The scheme can be extended to group signatures as demonstrated in section 5.3. In reality, we also
demonstrate a “pay-per-use” cryptographic primitive using the oracle. The advantage of our scheme
in comparison with other centralized schemes is that the central controller does not maintain any state
information of the groups it is managing. It just acts as a “computing device” for users registered with
it. We envisage several interesting applications of this primitive in the near future.
As we demonstrate, the ability to “multiply” using the oracle does not give us the ability to “divide”
in G because its order is unknown. This ensures that an “Euclidean”-like Algorithm does not work here.
The curious property of our O-SAOWF is that it is weakly invertible. In other words, given A ∈ G, it is
possible to compute two pairs (B,B′) ∈ G2 such that A = B ⋆ B′ even without using the oracle.9 We
conclude this section with two open questions.
1. Prove/disprove conjuncture 4.9. In other words, find the complexity of the group inversion problem
GIPG.
9To see this, sample B ← G. Then B′ = B−1 ⋆ A.
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2. Construct a group of hidden order where the group operation is computable and strongly non-
invertible. In other words, exhibit a practical SAOWF construction.
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APPENDIX
A Soundness Of Verify-In-Group Algorithm
The reader is referred to section 4.4, algorithm A-4 for the notation used here. First we define the
following problem.
Decision Exponent Class Problem [DECP(t,n,g,G1)]: Given {t, n, g,G1} ⊂ params and a pair (x, y) ∈
G1 × Z∗n2 , where x = g
a and y = tbrn mod n2 for unknowns (a, b, r) ∈ Zn × Zn × Z∗n, output 1 if
[a ≡ b (mod p) ⊻ a ≡ b (mod q)], otherwise output 0.
The following theorem shows that the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound if DECP(t,n,g,G1) is in-
tractable.
Theorem A.1. If the decision exponent class problem is hard then the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound.
Proof. The input to the Verify-In-Group algorithm is (x, y) ∈ G1×Z∗n2 . We must show that if the algorithm
outputs 1 then (x, y) ∈ G. Let x = ga and y = tbrn mod n2 for unknowns (a, b, r) ∈ Zn × Zn × Z∗n. The
transformation of (x, y) to (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in step 2 of the algorithm can be denoted by the mapping
f1 : Zn × Zn × Z∗n 7→ G1 × Z
∗
n2
(u, v, w) 7→ (gau+v, tbu+vrunwn mod n2)
Consider the cases when the algorithm outputs 1.
Case 1. [a ≡ b (mod p) ∧ a ≡ b (mod q)]: In this case a = b and so (x, y) ∈ G. Therefore, f1(u, v, w) ∈
G ∀ u, v, w ∈ domain(f1). In this case, the output of Verify-In-Group algorithm is consistent with
its requirements.
Case 2. [a 6≡ b (mod p) ∧ a 6≡ b (mod q)]: It is not hard to prove that the mapping f1 is a bijection in
this case. Since both sides of f1 have the same number of elements n
2φ(n), it is enough to prove
that f1 is invertible with respect to every element in G1×Z∗n2 . Let (g
a1 , tb1r1
n mod n2) ∈ G1×Z∗n2
be an element of the right side of f1. If a preimage (u1, v1, w1) of f1 exists for this element, then
we must have
a1 ≡ au1 + v1 (mod n)
b1 ≡ bu1 + v1 (mod n)
r1 ≡ ru1w1 (mod n)

 (12)
Clearly equation 12 has a unique solution in (u1, v1, w1) for all (a1, b1, r1) if and only if (a−b) ∈ Z∗n.
In other words, if and only if gcd(a− b, n) = 1. Note that gcd(a− b, n) = 1 is another way of saying
that [a 6≡ b (mod p) ∧ a 6≡ b (mod q)].
Since f1 is a bijection, the distributions {(x1, y1)} and {(x2, y2)} are identical to a random distri-
bution in G1 ×Z∗n2 . If the oracle O
∗ can make the algorithm output 1 then we can use O∗ to solve
CDHP(g,G1) (see section 3.1) as follows:
1. Input is g, gσ1 , gσ2 and our goal is to output gσ1σ2 .
2. Generate y1, y2
R
← Z∗n2
3. Set x1 ← g
σ1 and x2 ← g
σ2
4. Give (x1, y1), (x2, y2) as input to oracle O∗ in step 3 of the algorithm instead of the real values.
Since the forged and real distributions of {(x1, y1)} and {(x1, y2)} are identical, the oracleO∗ cannot
distinguish between the forged and real inputs. Accordingly it will reply with (x′, y′) such that the
algorithm outputs 1 in step 4. In this case x′ is the required solution to the CDHP(g,G1) instance.
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Case 3. [a ≡ b (mod p) ∧ a 6≡ b (mod q)]: (or gcd(a− b, n) > 1 and a 6= b)
The probability of a randomly picked pair (x, y) ∈ G1 × Z
∗
n2 such that gcd(a− b, n) > 1 and a 6= b
is p+q−2pq which can be neglected for large p, q. On the other hand, if the adversary (O
∗) knows in
advance that gcd(a − b, n) > 1 but does not know both of {a, b}, then the adversary knows that
the distribution of the image
f1(u1, v1, w1) = (g
a1 , tb1r1
n mod n2)
always satisfies a1 ≡ b1 (mod p). In this case, our security relies on the adversary’s inability to
distinguish elements of this distribution from randomly chosen elements of G1 × Z∗n2 assuming
the hardness of DECP(t,n,g,G1). Under this assumption, we can use the adversary O
∗ to solve
CDHP(g,G1) as in the previous case. The case of [a 6≡ b (mod p) ∧ a ≡ b (mod q)] is handled
similarly.
Thus, we have proved that the algorithm is sound under the assumption that the problems DECP(t,n,g,G1)
and CDHP(g,G1) are intractable.
B Identity Based Encryption Using O-SAOWFs
In this section we give (without a security proof) an Identity Based Encryption (IBE) scheme as another
application of our O-SAOWFs. We refer the reader to [23] for the definitions of an IBE scheme and to
section 4.4 for the notation used here. In summary, out IBE scheme has four PPT algorithms Setup-IBE,
KeyGen, ID-Encrypt and ID-Decrypt. The definition of “PPT” has the usual caveat; oracles are considered
as algorithms.
1. The Setup-IBE algorithm takes as input some security parameter. It outputs the IBE system
parameters par and the IBE master key m-key.
2. The KeyGen algorithm takes as input the value par, m-key and a random string i. It outputs the
private key prv-keyi corresponding to the string i.
3. The ID-Encrypt algorithm takes as input par, a random messagem and a random string i. It outputs
a ciphertext c.
4. The ID-Decrypt algorithm takes as input par, a private key prv-keyi (corresponding to some string
i) and ciphertext c. It outputs a message m.
The ID-Encrypt and ID-Decrypt algorithms satisfy the standard consistency constraint:
∀m ∀i ID-Decrypt(par, ID-Encrypt(par,m, i),KeyGen(par,m-key, i)) = m
In an IBE scheme, the master key m-key is known only to a trusted authority known as the Key
Generating Center (KGC) that is responsible for distributing private keys. In our construction although
the oracle O is required for computation, it need not be the Key Generating Center (KGC). The four
algorithms are described below.
1. Setup-IBE: Set (X, σX), (Y, σY )
R
← Sample(params) and set Z ← T (σX , 1, Y ) = X ⋆ Y . Finally set
par← (Y, Z) ∈ G2; m-key← (σX , σY ) ∈ Z∗n
2 and output (par,m-key).
2. KeyGen: Let i ∈ N be the input string. Set prv-keyi ← T (σX ,−i, Y ) = X
−i ⋆ Y ∈ G and output
prv-key.
3. ID-Encrypt: Our message space is {0, 1}k where k < log2(n) and we require a cryptographic hash
function H : G 7→ {0, 1}k. To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}k using input string i ∈ N, first generate
random (R, σR)
R
← Sample(params). Then compute
c1 = m⊕H(T (σR, 1, E(Y, i+ 1))) = m⊕H(Y
i+1 ⋆ R)
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C2 = T (σR, 1, E(Z, i)) = Z
i ⋆ R = X i ⋆ Y i ⋆ R
The ciphertext is (c1, C2).
Both c1 and C2 can be directly computed if Y
i+1 and Zi are precomputed.
4. ID-Decrypt: To decrypt arbitrary ciphertext (c1, C2) compute
m = c1 ⊕H(Ô(C2, prv-keyi)) = c1 ⊕H(C2 ⋆ X
−i ⋆ Y )
Decryption is correct, because for a legitimate ciphertext:
C2 ⋆ X
−i ⋆ Y = (X i ⋆ Y i ⋆ R) ⋆ (X−i ⋆ Y ) = Y i+1 ⋆ R
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